Intelligence Overview

Figure 1: Ukrainian Troops Train to Conduct a Combined Arms Obstacle Breach, Ukraine, March 2023…

… arms manoeuvre emphasises the concentration of armour, infantry and artillery at a point in time, …

Examine the capabilities that should be organic within the combat team and battlegroup. The second…

4. Author interviews with brigade operations staffs planning intelligence-led distant mining operations, Pokrovsk direction, January…

The emerging concept presented in this paper envisages a contact battle within a demarcated geographic…

… command posts, UAV pilots, artillery and hardened fighting positions . Russian forces thereafter deliberately target these …

October 2025 Insights Papers Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine Disclaimer Publications Team The …

… tactics, training and operations of three Ukrainian assault regiments/battalions (in the process of transition at …

… serve, these units are analogous to NATO battlegroups . The paper describes how these Ukrainian …

… is best done supported by tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs). The value of armoured vehicles in …

… on analogue video streaming. Armour and Protected Mobility

… the position: the first man covers the trench , the second throws grenades, and the …

… groups on buggies, bikes and sometimes armoured vehicles to rapidly advance along the seams of …

… necessity. Following the failure of its 2023 offensive operations , Ukraine moved onto a protracted defensive …

Examine the capabilities that should be organic within the combat team and battlegroup. The second…

4. Author interviews with brigade operations staffs planning intelligence-led distant mining operations, Pokrovsk direction, January…

5. Author review of data gathered by Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) General Staff Lessons…

Signals and Engineers Signals and engineering simultaneously are the ubiquitous enablers of all combat functions,…

… dispersed to cover several fighting positions. Their maintenance is carried out by a team which …

… out of contact can assemble and be resupplied . Ukrainian forces work to survey the …

… can survive 10–15 FPV hits while suffering repairable damage. Meanwhile, APCs protect the infantry from …

… fireteam moves through the position: the first man covers the trench, the second throws grenades, …

… ability to rotate troops and hence train replacements or integrate new personnel. Furthermore, political developments …

… troops, food, water and other consumables like fuel and batteries to fighting positions, and medical …

… on analogue video streaming. Armour and Protected Mobility

… of artillery, armoured vehicles, conventional ammunition and spare parts is trending downwards. Ensuring that these needs …

… on uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs), as their sustained fire, delivered from outside prepared fighting positions, …

… novel equipment. The research included interactions with personnel at platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade and …

… frame as the area where enemy reserves, logistics hubs , industrial targets or systems that cannot …

… thereafter deliberately target these with fires integrating strikes with artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), …

… is a crucial means of degrading enemy precision strikes . Jamming control frequencies and communications channels …

… independently, rather than in batteries. In addition, fire missions are very rarely more than 10 rounds …

… therefore an important planning consideration. Howitzers and Mortars A Artillery pieces remain fundamental to Ukrainian …

… energy and latency and are invulnerable to jamming , making them invaluable for this role.12 …

… the contact battle area, before isolating the targeted sector from resupply and support. In turn, …

… Ukraine put various bomber UAVs, FPV drones, loitering munitions and longerrange flying bombs into mass production. …

… emphasises the concentration of armour, infantry and artillery at a point in time, surprising the …

… defence turrets are used. For helicopters and cruise missiles , man-portable air defence systems are preferred. …

… This is then followed up with persistent interdiction missions by FPVs, to prevent attempts to …

… Meanwhile, APCs protect the infantry from enemy indirect fire . Ukrainian units generally field a mix …

… ongoing battle – versus its concept of deep strike against targets that will have an impact …

… using electronic intelligence and by examining historical counterbattery data for the area. Remaining questions must …

… draw on EW and conventional artillery, especially rocket artillery . Supersonic rockets are advantageous because the …

Examine the capabilities that should be organic within the combat team and battlegroup. The second…

5. Author review of data gathered by Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) General Staff Lessons…

… tools to process and analyse returns from dispersed electronic, acoustic and other sensors allows the …

4. Author interviews with brigade operations staffs planning intelligence-led distant mining operations, Pokrovsk direction, January…

It should be noted that with these precautions, artillery and mortars can be highly survivable.…

… radar, command posts, UAV pilots, artillery and hardened fighting positions. Russian forces thereafter deliberately target …

… third party. References to RUSI include its Cover image: Jack Watling directors and employees. © …

… Where the enemy has dug positions with overhead protection , Ukrainian forces use explosively formed projectiles, …

… locating associated air defences and depleting their interceptors . Powered bombs can therefore be a …

… from infantry. With appropriate modification, armour can survive 10–15 FPV hits while suffering repairable damage. …

… caused by the challenges of resupply and concealment . The optimised Ukrainian section comprises seven …

… including pilots using fibreoptic cables. As offensive counter-UAV methodologies have started to expand, pilots have …

11. Author interviews with and observations of Ukrainian battalion and regimental commanders during operational planning…

… Author interviews with brigade operations staffs planning intelligence -led distant mining operations, Pokrovsk direction, January …

… all operations in Ukraine. Electronic intelligence ( ELINT ) is the most reliable passive means …

Examine the capabilities that should be organic within the combat team and battlegroup. The second…

4. Author interviews with brigade operations staffs planning intelligence-led distant mining operations, Pokrovsk direction, January…

… the middle battle area while countering enemy sensor coverage of the contact battle area, before …

… sector, it is necessary to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the enemy systems protecting it in …

… supplies to casualties. 18. Author review of battle damage assessments by Ukrainian intelligence, Ukraine, June 2025. 19. …

… systematically identify Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) positions, radar , command posts, UAV pilots, artillery and …

… Ukraine Make the corps responsible for the collective training of recruits. To have forces able …

… A UGV will be protected by air surveillance so that it can go static or …

Examine the capabilities that should be organic within the combat team and battlegroup. The second…

Signals and Engineers Signals and engineering simultaneously are the ubiquitous enablers of all combat functions,…

11. Author interviews with and observations of Ukrainian battalion and regimental commanders during operational planning…

Figure 2: Ukrainian Battlefield Geometry Source: The author. Graphic design: Alex Whitworth Art & Design.…

4. Author interviews with brigade operations staffs planning intelligence-led distant mining operations, Pokrovsk direction, January…

… identify Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) positions, radar, command posts , UAV pilots, artillery and hardened fighting …

… of Ukrainian battalion and regimental commanders during operational planning for offensive action, and author discussions with …

… example. In addition, widespread access to space-based communications and digital tools to process and analyse …

… improvement in the application of fires and command and control (C2), Russia has maladapted during the conflict. …

… problems which arise when piloting UAVs via reachback are not as significant for ground vehicles, …

… focus on naval platforms (which primarily provide long-range fires ) and on improving Russia’s SAM network …

… significant, was not critical. Russian rates of fire across the frontline steadily rose after the …

Escalatory Dimensions of a Strike Campaign A second relatively cost-effective offset available to Russia to…

136. Tracy Cozzens, ‘Downed Russian Jets Found with GPS Receivers Taped Inside’, GPS World, 13…

Russia’s Geography and the Growing Cost of Integrated Air and Missile Defence On the offensive…

… 5 Deep Strike for Battlefield Interdiction 5 Targeting Command and Control and Communications 7 Russian …

… relatively anodyne strike capabilities such as short-range ballistic missiles can have a disproportionately competitive effect for …

… 29 August 2024. 18. Jack Watling, ‘ Long-Range Precision Fires in the Russo-Ukrainian War’, in Dag Henriksen …

… guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS), Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing-II intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) …

… Russian and Allied Capabilities in a Modern Strike Campaign Occasional Paper 194 years of independent …

… this asset would allow Russia to continuously jam satellites, and on a wide-reaching basis, as …

… a cruise missile,40 and while the Iranian Shahed-136 costs significantly less, this comes at a …

… Ukraine, the effectiveness of missiles such as Storm Shadow in tactical terms seems to have been …

… such as Army Tactical Missile Systems ( ATACMS ), the challenge of target development might …

… the KH-101 and the KH-22) and cheaper one-way attack UAVs. In the initial phases of the …

… with the latter assault supported by 78,000 artillery rounds.11 By contrast, close air support against …

… which did not eventually receive a hit-to-kill warhead – will live up to claims made …

… The decision to opt for a blast fragmentation solution and a Ku band-seeker imposes costs …

Optimal defensive solution (fewest interceptors used) Ratio of interceptors used Dual-capable surface-based interceptors 2.0 Medium-range…

While the outputs of the paper are not definitive with respect to procurement choices, they…

www.rusi.org www.rusi.org Occasional Paper A Net Assessment of Russian and Allied Capabilities in a Modern…

4. See, for example, Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs, Transformation…

Development of the Weapons System and the New Image of the Armed Forces’], Защита и…

… challenges. Chief among these is that both protecting critical military capabilities and providing security to …

… Russia’s Geography and the Growing Cost of Integrated Air and Missile Defence 24 The Balance of ISR/Counter-ISR Capabilities 29 …

… with lower-cost UAVs to saturate and dislocate surface-to-air -missile (SAM) systems.23 The heavier the burden …

… respect to providing ground-based air defence ( GBAD ) to the frontline – in turn …

… readiness and allocating limited GBAD capabilities to force protection . This does not reduce the strain …

… its deep-strike capabilities depend are either non- survivable (such as surface vessels) or relatively limited …

… on ground stations, although a combination of hardening and IAMD can mitigate this risk.120

… be able to serve the purpose of concealing mobile launcher systems consistently, and at a …

… that their targets are typically able to disperse ahead of the strike’s arrival. There are, …

htm>, accessed 28 August 2024; Charlotte Le Breton, ‘France’s Signal Ambition for Space-Based Intelligence’, Military…

While the outputs of the paper are not definitive with respect to procurement choices, they…

102. Scherbakov and Nikulin, «Взгляды руководства вооруженных сил США и их союзников на проблемы информационно-космического…

Furthermore, a range of other tools with adequate processing power can be more fruitfully used.…

Irrespective of whether their battlefield utility dramatically increases, deep strike capabilities have several important competitive…

… over time). Currently, tasks such as intermediate target development are highly time consuming (as reflected in …

… Missile Defence 24 The Balance of ISR/ Counter-ISR Capabilities 29 Allied Counter-C4ISR 36 Escalatory Dimensions …

… shoot-look-shoot approach to surface-based BMD presumes longrange radar comparable to the AN/TPY-2 or the Green …

… turn believed that the convergence of high-fidelity sensors , processing power and deep strike were …

… system that could prevent optical and radar reconnaissance satellites from imaging by preventing their signals from …

… may bring to fruition the kind of reconnaissance strike complex that was envisioned in the …

… 17 July 2024. advanced target development and pattern-of-life analysis.36 Similarly, aspects of planning, such as …

… best competitive strategy. However, NATO members can, collectively , field considerably more air assets than …

… from research, publications and conferences, RUSI has sustained its political independence for 194 years. The …

While the outputs of the paper are not definitive with respect to procurement choices, they…

Furthermore, a range of other tools with adequate processing power can be more fruitfully used.…

102. Scherbakov and Nikulin, «Взгляды руководства вооруженных сил США и их союзников на проблемы информационно-космического…

The mobility of air-based systems allows them to close off larger channels with smaller numbers…

… dislocated in depth incentivises forward deployment and readiness , both of which run counter to …

… NVA was able to rely on forward-positioned stockpiles and then pivot to a truck-based system …

… Revolution in Military Affairs, Transformation and the Defence Industry ’, Security Challenges (Vol. 4, No. 4, …

… was degraded to the point of non-functionality.14 Supply-line disruptions caused by air strikes on 126 …

… and deflect efforts to eliminate Russia’s own productive capacity is viewed as central to the ability …

… can both shape the contours of Russia’s force generation , and reinforce specific lessons that Russia …

… in Geilenkirchen Air Base in Germany.91 Its maintenance is a continuing problem, while the operational …

… will draw on inputs such as solid fuel propellant and microprocessors that are employed in …

… which would need to be augmented by conscripts in a crisis – a time-consuming process. …

… from delivering large volumes of personnel and materiel to the frontline. The results, while important, …

… expected life expectancy, with limited prospects for replacement .100 This is especially true in comparison …

… against targets such as SA-11 TELs ( transport erector launchers) and GMLRS, among other systems, …

While the outputs of the paper are not definitive with respect to procurement choices, they…

23. See Black Sea News, ‘Review and Database of Ukrainian Attacks on the Occupied Crimea,…

Furthermore, a range of other tools with adequate processing power can be more fruitfully used.…

Irrespective of whether their battlefield utility dramatically increases, deep strike capabilities have several important competitive…

15. Thomas A Keaney and Eliot A Cohen, ‘Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report’,…

… Deep Strike for Battlefield Interdiction 5 Targeting Command and Control and Communications 7 Russian Deep Strike 8 …

… had to be fed into Akatsia-M (Russia’s battle management system ) at the national defence management centre …

… air defences and methods of disrupting adversary kill chains in both the USSR and post-Soviet Russia. …

… processing power, meanwhile, can accelerate and augment targeting processes in ways that enable forces to exploit …

… forces and dislocate the USSR’s command-and-control ( C2 ) structures before contact on the Forward …

… rationale for denying NATO a level of situational awareness that Russia itself is unlikely to be …

… example, that the ability to target Russian command posts beyond 90 km did not decisively alter …

… its own competitive advantages to shape Russian decision-making , and how it can mitigate the …

… gathered from more sensitive assets via US headquarters .99 The question is whether the lessons …

While the outputs of the paper are not definitive with respect to procurement choices, they…

Irrespective of whether their battlefield utility dramatically increases, deep strike capabilities have several important competitive…

вероятного противника от развязывания военных конфликтов» [‘The Concept of Military-Technical Asymmetric Response to Deter a…

Furthermore, a range of other tools with adequate processing power can be more fruitfully used.…

The second facet of defensive operations which must be considered is that layering can only…

… road) to resource attacks such as its assaults on Qang Tri and An Loc, with …

… the resolution at which targets such as armoured personnel carriers can be reliably classified33). Moreover, the existing …

… depth) at their maximum ranges restricts their manoeuvrability and provides defenders with ample warning time. …

… and Nick Reynolds, ‘Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations , 2022–23’, RUSI, 18 July 2024, p. …

… the ability to engage the Soviet second echelon at operational and even theatre depths.1 Capabilities …

… in some ways easier against hypersonic glide vehicles than against comparably ranged ballistic missiles (which …

… processes in ways that enable forces to exploit the growth of available data. To use …

… the UK’s leading defence and security think tank . Its mission is to inform, influence …

… and ultimately sets the conditions for violence. Countering disinformation , although still necessary, is far less …

In the face of this threat, Western states must appreciate that undermining the human intelligence…

www.rusi.org Special Report The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24 Jack Watling, Oleksandr…

This report, primarily concerned with the latter part of this cycle, has demonstrated three things.…

18. Служба внешней разведки Российской Федераци [Foreign Intelligence Services of the Russian Federation], «куос без…

… placed on the interrelationship between subversion through propaganda and human intelligence and its exploitation through …

… Jack Watling (eds), Necessary Heresies: Challenging the Narratives Distorting Contemporary UK Defence, RUSI Whitehall Paper …

… The reasons for failure were consistent: poor operational security leading to the exposure of the plan …

… the second attempt to destabilise Moldova, Russian disinformation targeting the country became much more consistent …

… was guilty of his own murder.100 Russian troll farms amplified this pronouncement among Arab audiences.

… of Russia’s explicit involvement causing a growing perception of economic exploitation and colonialism, undermining Moscow’s …

… Yevkurov, accompanied by former Wagner commanders. The message they delivered to key partners was consistent: …

The Malian government signed a peace agreement with Tuareg and Arab rebels in 2015, with…

10. Philip Anulov, Вооруженное восстание [Armed Uprising] (Military–Political Academy, Department of Civil War, 1930). 11.…

This report is divided into three chapters. Chapter I considers the establishment and growth of…

Coordination with International Partners’, fact sheet, 19 May 2023, <https://www.state.gov/united-statesimposes-additional-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-russia/>, accessed 19 December 2023. 52.…

Another important vector in the regeneration of a support apparatus is the Russian exile community.…

… achieved their coup against the Russian Provisional Government in October 1917.5 It was also via …

… call for a change in leadership to stabilise the situation. This failed, partly because the …

… lucrative business opportunities and foster goodwill with international organised crime. In Ukraine, for example, Russia has …

… special services: the seeding of agents into refugee groups; and the use of martial arts …

… Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation. This organisation funded the reconstruction of mosques in Aleppo,96 but also promotes …

78. Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Dmitry Medvedev’s Meeting with President of the Republic of…

www.rusi.org Special Report The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24 Jack Watling, Oleksandr…

The resilience of the approach in the long term is also worth noting. The extent…

86. Jason Burke, ‘Russian Mercenaries Behind Slaughter of 500 in Mali Village, UN Report Finds’,…

18. Служба внешней разведки Российской Федераци [Foreign Intelligence Services of the Russian Federation], «куос без…

… modern analytical techniques, including the association of mobile phones with specified locations using advertising data …

… together both human intelligence and special forces personnel . This duality of skills was exemplified …

… responsible for managing support infrastructure, and a supply unit. In total, the centre appears to …

… Want to Run”: The Russian Men Fleeing Conscription ’, The Guardian, 27 September 2022. structure …

… the provision of food to servicemen and maintenance of military units’ housing stock. From May …

… forces assassinated President Hafizullah Amin to be replaced by the Soviet client Babrak 10. Philip …

… of the 10th Special Forces Brigade.50 The transport of Wagner Group fighters and goods to …

18. Служба внешней разведки Российской Федераци [Foreign Intelligence Services of the Russian Federation], «куос без…

In early 2023, the authors published a study of Russia’s unconventional operations targeting Ukraine directly,…

Information operations are a critical enabler of Russia’s destabilisation and subversion efforts and are therefore…

The ‘offer’ the GRU is now pushing is being internally described as the ‘regime survival…

Reforming Moscow’s Vanguard 8 II. ‘Roscolonialism’: Wagner and the GRU’s Expeditionary Corps 14 The Wagner…

… 29 March 2023. warfare and active measures exploited by agents of influence are core components …

… of Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2023). …

… of Defence, which included, in addition to armoured vehicles and artillery, anti-aircraft and electronic warfare …

… modern analytical techniques, including the association of mobile phones with specified locations using advertising data …

… methodologies overlap. Arguments that the scale of obstacles faced by the Wagner Group in the …

… the UK’s leading defence and security think tank . Its mission is to inform, influence …

… costs and are apparently used as a vehicle for recruitment. Since these individuals are often …

18. Служба внешней разведки Российской Федераци [Foreign Intelligence Services of the Russian Federation], «куос без…

In the face of this threat, Western states must appreciate that undermining the human intelligence…

4. Calder Walton, Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West (London: Abacus, 2023).…

Information operations are a critical enabler of Russia’s destabilisation and subversion efforts and are therefore…

… 19 December 2023. 37. The 161 Centre’s order of battle as of summer 2023, obtained by the …

… This argued that ‘the success of a HUMINT [human intelligence]-combat operation in modern conditions depends …

… at reducing the signature and vulnerability to pattern-of-life analysis. The separation of training from a …

… writing on Russia’s conduct of strategic intelligence collection by recruiting agents and penetrations in Western …

… Patrakhaltsev, who started his career in special reconnaissance units but subsequently worked in both the …

The ongoing war in Ukraine has provoked significant open-source research, analysis and commentary about the…

1.2. Structure of this report In addition to this introductory chapter, this report is structured…

• Is it a matter for doctrine to reflect overlooked or under-resourced issues such as…

1.1.1. The conflict in Ukraine has provoked a race to learn from the fighting, in…

• How to manage the dilemmas posed by the more ‘transparent’ battlespace with proliferation of…

… Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO Non-commissioned officer NGO Non-governmental organisation OCA Offensive counter-air OSINT Open-source intelligence PAGs …

… of providing for human security and the protection of civilians , including dealing with war crimes and …

… more positional, attritional warfare? manoeuvrist approach, the comprehensive approach or mission command. The war certainly indicates …

… and fertiliser, driving up inflation and threatening stability in the Middle East and North Africa …

… especially munitions. Shortfalls are also reported in readiness , training, infrastructure, etc., and in levels …

• Is it a matter for doctrine to reflect overlooked or under-resourced issues such as…

… from the battlefield. Readiness: Acute pressure on force generation cycles, equipment availability, industrial capacity and supply …

Implication for joint doctrine Potential further action for the Doctrine team Action: Publicise current doctrine,…

• The deployment of IADS and GBAD: The deployment of GBAD has underscored the poor…

… in 2025 and beyond. • Emphasis on sustainment of both the capacity and the will-to-fight …

… logistics hubs, ammunition dumps, fuel depots and ground lines of communication to long-range fires, drones or attacks by …

… and Mortar CAS Close air support CASEVAC Casualty evacuation CyEM Cyber and electromagnetic DCA Defensive counter-air …

… increasingly facing challenges recruiting fresh troops to replace battlefield losses.7 • The importance of intelligence …

… experience, training and balance of professional versus conscript forces).31 • The challenge of shortcomings in …

… of munitions has highlighted a lag in production capacity to replenish stockpiles effectively. With regards to …

… direct attacks on Ukrainian industrial facilities and supply chains in attempts to frustrate the war …

… need for critical mass in personnel, infrastructure, materiel and stockpiles. This observation has reignited debates …

… units, etc. given unit morale issues. Sustainability: Defence industry and MRO placed onto war footing far …

… February. As of 16 September 2024: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/14/europenato-military-russia-war-ukraine-conscriptiondraft-reserves-training- manpower / Fedorenko, V.L. & M.V. Fedorenko. 2022. …

• How to manage the dilemmas posed by the more ‘transparent’ battlespace with proliferation of…

… maximise survivability, and the associated challenges with command and control (C2), signature management, concentration of forces and …

1. Collating any existing open-source • Given this uncertainty, speculating about the future of the…

• Is it a matter for doctrine to reflect overlooked or under-resourced issues such as…

The ongoing war in Ukraine has provoked significant open-source research, analysis and commentary about the…

… AI Artificial intelligence C2 Command and control C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and …

… research organisation that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. To learn more …

… Positioning, navigation and timing SAM Surface-to-air missile SATCOM Satellite communication SDA Space domain awareness SEAD …

… effective ‘reconnaissancestrike complexes’ and more efficient ‘ kill chains ’, so that they can find, fix …

… This serves to guide operational-level commanders and headquarters . Responsibility for developing and maintaining Allied …

… the battlespace. This has sped up the targeting cycle and necessitated that forces on both sides …

… modelling and simulation as helpful techniques to operational planning or mission rehearsal. This was particularly seen …

… EM spectrum can significantly impede C4ISR and reachback to higher echelons (necessitating reversionary modes for …

1. Collating any existing open-source • Given this uncertainty, speculating about the future of the…

The ongoing war in Ukraine has provoked significant open-source research, analysis and commentary about the…

• The likely trajectory and outcomes of Ukrainian and Russian operations in 2025 and beyond.…

• The persistence of a continuum of conflict: The war has also emphasised that competition…

Russia’s War in Ukraine Emerging Insights for UK and NATO Joint Doctrine James Black, Pauline…

… to stay connected. Cyber-attacks, electronic warfare and information operations have all helped shape the fighting.

… the Cyber-Attacks of 2007.’ European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ECCWS. As of 16 September …

… tactical decision making, and the pursuit of information advantage . Neither manoeuvre nor positional warfare have …

… though least of all inside of Russia), countering disinformation and misinformation.38 This includes through charismatic leadership …

… of precision-munitions and using non-kinetic effectors like offensive cyber for attacks against high-value targets and key …

… off-guard: a deeper understanding of adversaries’ goals, perceptions , fears and decision-making calculus is needed. …

… (2022); Colom-Piella (2022). 99 US Space Command Public Affairs Office (2021). McCrory (2020). Russia’s War in …

… & N. Shuliak. 2023. ‘The Concept of Strategic Communications in Ukrainian Scientific Research.’ Ad Alta-Journal of …

… Doctrine team Action: Publicise current doctrine, e.g., operational security and deception. Tactical lessons are being relearned. …

… air defences and counter-UAS capabilities, multispectral camouflage, decoys and deception as ways to maximise the …

… https://www.scopus.com/inward/record. uri?eid=2-s2.0-84912016643&doi=10.1080%2f13 523260.2014.963965&partnerID=40&md5=734ad 21ea5946cac3f065071953219ea ————. 2023. ‘ Propaganda at Play: A Thematic Analysis of Belarusian …

… Persuasion Research Reveals About Ukraine’s and Russia’s Messaging on the War. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND …

… resilience and will to fight, or the protection of the UK homeland from proliferating standoff …

• Is it a matter for doctrine to reflect overlooked or under-resourced issues such as…

Implication for joint doctrine Potential further action for the Doctrine team Action: Publicise current doctrine,…

… associated challenges with command and control (C2), signature management , concentration of forces and effects to …

… characterise future operations in a battlespace where concealment , movement and concentration of forces is …

… disperse, hide, dig in or move to survive . Space-based broadband has helped military forces …

… military company PNT Positioning, navigation and timing SAM Surface-to-air missile SATCOM Satellite communication SDA Space …

… all levels and a renewed interest in air and missile defence , especially ground-based, given the lack of …

… mortar (C-RAM) systems, organic air defences and counter-UAS capabilities, multispectral camouflage, decoys and deception as …

… integration and capacity challenges to establishing genuine integrated air and missile defence , particularly beyond Kyiv. The war has …

… protection systems, explosive reactive armour, slat and cage armour etc.) in the face of proliferating anti-armour …

… trench warfare, with both sides preparing field fortifications and minefields, and employing large numbers of …

… Cambridge, UK R® is a registered trademark. Cover : Adobe Stock i Preface

The ongoing war in Ukraine has provoked significant open-source research, analysis and commentary about the…

1. Collating any existing open-source • Given this uncertainty, speculating about the future of the…

… concentration of forces and effects to achieve breakthroughs , or logistics in a contested environment?

• Is it a matter for doctrine to reflect overlooked or under-resourced issues such as…

Emphasises the crucial distinction between innovation (combining old with new) vs adaptation (to counter the…

… are used alongside massed artillery and gruelling trench warfare. For more information about this study, …

… a breach. The much more successful Russian defence-in-depth against the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive demonstrated the …

… heavy toll that comes with trying to breach well-prepared fixed defences, especially in the absence …

… and reconnaissance IWC Integrated Warfare Centre MBT Main battle tank MDO Multi-domain operation MENA Middle East and …

… [AI] or the future of naval or armoured warfare).

… as actors seek to test, blur and exploit the blurred thresholds between war and peace.18 …

… the face of proliferating anti-armour threats (including anti-tank guided missiles with top-attack capabilities, UAS and …

… limiting Russia’s use of its naval and amphibious capabilities and enabling a reallocation of Ukrainian …

… capabilities deployed selectively, primarily controlled from higher echelons , and often with long lead times.82 …

… of open-source analysis and commentary by think tanks , academics, industry and others. Both sides …

… over the survivability of crewed vehicles or dismounted infantry in an age of proliferating UxVs. …

… denial in support of movement, concentration and offensive operations .92 EW has proved to be a …

… or attack roles and the initial airborne assault on Hostamel in the IPoW proved a …

… from the rollout of artificial intelligence, uncrewed vehicles (UxVs) and human-machine teaming (HMT) at all …

• Is it a matter for doctrine to reflect overlooked or under-resourced issues such as…

1.2. Structure of this report In addition to this introductory chapter, this report is structured…

… mass of personnel, equipment or stockpiles, especially munitions . Shortfalls are also reported in readiness, …

Implication for joint doctrine Potential further action for the Doctrine team Action: Publicise current doctrine,…

Jeswal, R. 2015. ‘Battlespace Perspectives of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine.’ Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned…

… depots and ground lines of communication to long-range fires , drones or attacks by special operations …

… Satellite communication SDA Space domain awareness SEAD Suppression of enemy air defences SLOCs Sea lines of communication SODCIT Strategic …

… the battlespace. This has sped up the targeting cycle and necessitated that forces on both …

… first-person view drones are used alongside massed artillery and gruelling trench warfare. For more information …

… proliferation of UAS of all types, including loitering munitions , has been a defining feature of …

… EW, SOFs and/or crewed aircraft (e.g., using Storm Shadow /SCALP), to create and exploit temporary gaps …

… the initial hack of Viasat’s KA-SAT network, jamming , spoofing and cyber-attacks on Starlink. Such …

… for Future Combat: Unmanned Aerial Systems and Deep Strike .’ Parameters: U.S. Army War College 53 …

… Ukraine’s use of asymmetric weapons, including anti-ship cruise missiles and UxVs, has allowed them to exercise …

… and mines).42 • The importance of reconnaissance- strike complexes: The war has demonstrated the increasing …

1. Collating any existing open-source • Given this uncertainty, speculating about the future of the…

• How to manage the dilemmas posed by the more ‘transparent’ battlespace with proliferation of…

The ongoing war in Ukraine has provoked significant open-source research, analysis and commentary about the…

• The likely trajectory and outcomes of Ukrainian and Russian operations in 2025 and beyond.…

… control C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

… intelligence (AI), smartphone apps, new types of sensors and commercial satellite imagery has brought unprecedented …

… officer NGO Non-governmental organisation OCA Offensive counter-air OSINT Open-source intelligence PAGs Partners across government PGM Precision-guided munition …

… force lowvolume assets such as air defence radars and missile launchers to expose their position. …

INTSUM 001 010700Oct 2024 Intelligence assessment AOO 10th Div TF CANIS LUPUS last 7 days…

ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Multimedia center IED encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 0…

INTSUM 001 010700Oct 2024 Intelligence assessment AOO 10th Div TF CANIS LUPUS last 7 days…

ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Multimedia center IED encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 0…

INTSUM 002 200700 Mar 2025 Intelligence assessment AOO 10th Div TF CANIS LUPUS last 7…

ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Cache Drive by shooting IED encountered last 24 Hrs…

… BAD MUSKAU – Drive by shooting Source: Host Nation Police 191600L Mar 2025 BAD MUSKAU 2 …

INTSUM 001 201900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO 1st…

IED encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 01 Anti-Personnel: 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last 24…

… encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 01 Anti- Personnel : 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last …

INTSUM 001 201900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO 1st…

… DORRWALDE – 33U VT 34993 14352 An armoured ambulance was ambushed just South of DORRWALDE. …

IED encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 01 Anti-Personnel: 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last 24…

… events: 02 Nbr of hybrid events: 01 Intelligence assessment AOO 1st Mec Bde 10 Div …

IDF attacks Source: 1/1-2-3/1 Bde 200615L Mar 2025 CALAU - GROBRÄCHEN A coordinated ENY IDF…

IED encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 01 Anti-Personnel: 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last 24…

GREEN 12: IED Source: 1/2/2 Bde 201634L Mar 2025 West of GLAUSSCHNITZ – 33U VS…

INTSUM 001 201900 Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO…

RED 7: UAS attack Source: 1/2/2 Bde 201025L Mar 2025 OTTENDORF – 33U VS 18282…

… 2nd Bn took heavy casualties. BDA: 03 C2 vehicles destroyed, 02 Signals vehicles destroyed 06 …

… events: 10 Nbr of hybrid events: 04 Intelligence assessment AOO 2 Bde 10 Div TF …

GREEN 12: IED Source: 1/2/2 Bde 201634L Mar 2025 West of GLAUSSCHNITZ – 33U VS…

RED 7: UAS attack Source: 1/2/2 Bde 201025L Mar 2025 OTTENDORF – 33U VS 18282…

Red 2: RUHLAND – AOO 2 Bde – DF Recce Platoon Source: 1/1/2 Bde 200323L…

GREEN 12: IED Source: 1/2/2 Bde 201634L Mar 2025 West of GLAUSSCHNITZ – 33U VS…

RED 7: UAS attack Source: 1/2/2 Bde 201025L Mar 2025 OTTENDORF – 33U VS 18282…

… It is highly likely that SOF and proxy forces will continue to try to deny our …

Red 2: RUHLAND – AOO 2 Bde – DF Recce Platoon Source: 1/1/2 Bde 200323L…

… Tagesanlagen un kohleumschlagsplatz. The site is on fire , local firedepartment is trying to contain …

HYBRID events GREEN 4: IED Source: 1/2/2 Bde 200733L Mar 2025 NE of BERNSDORF –…

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Conventional Recce IDF Attack UAS Attack Cx…

… BERNSDORF – 33U VS 37184 93718 The Host Nation Police LnO drove on an IED. He …

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Conventional Recce IDF Attack UAS Attack Cx…

INTSUM 001 201900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO 4…

… It is highly likely that SOF and proxy forces will continue to try to deny our …

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Conventional Recce IDF Attack UAS Attack Cx…

HYBRID events GREEN 4: IED Source: 1/2/2 Bde 200733L Mar 2025 NE of BERNSDORF –…

INTSUM 001 20190Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO IW…

Emerging trends Nihil Threat Matrix Cx Attack VERY LOW SAF LOW IDF MEDIUM VOIED HIGH…

… encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 01 Anti- Personnel : 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last …

Red 3: HOSENA – AOO IW Bde – IDF attack railway crossing Source: 1/2/IW Bde…

… events: 10 Nbr of hybrid events: 01 Intelligence assessment AOO IW Bde 10 Div TF …

Emerging trends Nihil Threat Matrix Cx Attack VERY LOW SAF LOW IDF MEDIUM VOIED HIGH…

RED 9: SIGINT intercept Source: 1/2/IW Bde 201015L Mar 2025 LAUTA – 33U VS 37404…

Red 3: HOSENA – AOO IW Bde – IDF attack railway crossing Source: 1/2/IW Bde…

Emerging trends Nihil Threat Matrix Cx Attack VERY LOW SAF LOW IDF MEDIUM VOIED HIGH…

RED 9: SIGINT intercept Source: 1/2/IW Bde 201015L Mar 2025 LAUTA – 33U VS 37404…

… It is highly likely that SOF and proxy forces will continue to try to limit our …

Red 3: HOSENA – AOO IW Bde – IDF attack railway crossing Source: 1/2/IW Bde…

… encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 0 Anti- Personnel : 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last …

INTSUM 003 210700L Mar 25 Intelligence assessment AOO 10th Div TF CANIS LUPUS last 7…

… SOF are conducting operations to harass our supply lines , and to challenge our FoM. It …

SIGINT intercepts Source: 1/IW/2 Bde 20 Mar 2025 All over the AOO ENY radio transmissions…

CONVENTIONAL threats ENY Recce troops cross the border Source: 1st, IW and 2nd Bde 20…

INTSUM 003 210700L Mar 25 Intelligence assessment AOO 10th Div TF CANIS LUPUS last 7…

Cyber attacks Source: MNC NE 20 Mar 2025 Following the sinking of the BOIKIY major…

SIGINT intercepts Source: 1/IW/2 Bde 20 Mar 2025 All over the AOO ENY radio transmissions…

CONVENTIONAL threats ENY Recce troops cross the border Source: 1st, IW and 2nd Bde 20…

SEDLITZ – AOO IW Bde - Ambush Source: 1/1/IW Bde 201530L Mar 2025 North of…

Cyber attacks Source: MNC NE 20 Mar 2025 Following the sinking of the BOIKIY major…

INTSUM 003 210700L Mar 25 Intelligence assessment AOO 10th Div TF CANIS LUPUS last 7…

SIGINT intercepts Source: 1/IW/2 Bde 20 Mar 2025 All over the AOO ENY radio transmissions…

… 02 own WIA Cat C G2 ASSESSMENT/ Proxy forces controlled by ENY SOF are conducting operations …

CONVENTIONAL threats ENY Recce troops cross the border Source: 1st, IW and 2nd Bde 20…

Red 17: MLODE – AOO 1st Mech Bde – UAS attack 211434L Mar 2025 West…

INTSUM 002 211900 Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO…

… IDF IED encountered last 24 Hrs Anti- vehicle : 00 Anti-Personnel: 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM …

… 33U VT 30191 18549 Light infantry platoons infiltrated through the woods N of GROSBRACHEN. Own …

Red 7: RETTCHENSDORF – AOO 1st Mech Bde – IDF attack 210547L Mar 2025 RETTCHENSDORF…

Red 7: RETTCHENSDORF – AOO 1st Mech Bde – IDF attack 210547L Mar 2025 RETTCHENSDORF…

… The attack was accompanied by heavy IDF fire . BDA: 01 BMP-2 destroyed. 01 1V14 …

Red 17: MLODE – AOO 1st Mech Bde – UAS attack 211434L Mar 2025 West…

… Switches: 0 Main charges: 0 Containers: 0 Fragmentation : 0 Small Arms Weapons Ammunition IDF …

… 29655 24914 The village pf LUCKAITZ was targeted by IDF. The village is pretty much …

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Conventional attack - BTG IDF Attack UAS…

INTSUM 002 211900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO 2…

… Red 4: AOO 2 Bde – Dispersed minefields 210547L Mar 2025 Dispersed minefields in following …

… block E of GLAUSCHNITZ. LTU Riflemen responded. All armed men were killed in action. BDA: Nihil …

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs Conventional attack - BTG IDF Attack UAS…

… It is highly likely that SOF and proxy forces will continue to try to deny our …

… Nihil Red 4: AOO 2 Bde – Dispersed minefields 210547L Mar 2025 Dispersed minefields in …

RED 8: KÖNINGBRÜCK – AOO 2 Bde - SIGINT intercept 211131L Mar 2025 KÖNINGBRÜCK –…

… Switches: 0 Main charges: 0 Containers: 0 Fragmentation : 0 Small Arms Weapons Ammunition IDF …

… attack hit SCHWENITZ. Preliminary information points to rocket artillery . The attack caused massive CIVCAS. BDA: …

INTSUM 002 211900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO 2…

RED 8: KÖNINGBRÜCK – AOO 2 Bde - SIGINT intercept 211131L Mar 2025 KÖNINGBRÜCK –…

INTSUM 002 211900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO 4…

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs UAS Attack SOF raid IED Poisoning IED…

Green 3: GRAUSTEIN – AOO 4 Bde – IED attack powerstation 2104546L Mar 2025 Powerstation…

… retreated to the EAST BDA: 01 LSF armored vehicle destroyed Casualties: 07 ENY SOF KIA, …

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs UAS Attack SOF raid IED Poisoning IED…

Green 3: GRAUSTEIN – AOO 4 Bde – IED attack powerstation 2104546L Mar 2025 Powerstation…

Geographical overview ENY TTP encountered last 24 Hrs UAS Attack SOF raid IED Poisoning IED…

Green 3: GRAUSTEIN – AOO 4 Bde – IED attack powerstation 2104546L Mar 2025 Powerstation…

… It is highly likely that SOF and proxy forces will continue to try to deny our …

INTSUM 002 211900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO IW…

… by persons wearing civilian clothes armed with assault rifles. The LTU Riflemen attacked the roadblock, …

RED 7: SENFTENBERG - AOO IW Bde – SIGINT intercept 211025L Mar 2025 SENFTENBERG –…

… - AOO IW Bde – IDF dispersed minefield 210815L Mar 2025 KEINKOSCHEN – 33U VT …

HYBRID events GREEN 11: GRUNEWALD – AOO IW Bde - Ambush 21 1530L Mar 2025…

… It is highly likely that SOF and proxy forces will continue to try to limit our …

RED 7: SENFTENBERG - AOO IW Bde – SIGINT intercept 211025L Mar 2025 SENFTENBERG –…

… KLEINKOSCHEN - AOO IW Bde – IDF dispersed minefield 210815L Mar 2025 KEINKOSCHEN – 33U …

… encountered last 24 Hrs Anti-vehicle: 00 Anti- Personnel : 0 Anti-Infra: 0 CEM encountered last …

INTSUM 002 211900Mar 2025 This INTSUM is the summary of events in the AOO IW…

RED 7: SENFTENBERG - AOO IW Bde – SIGINT intercept 211025L Mar 2025 SENFTENBERG –…

… VT 22494 00654 33U VT 23599 00926 Sustained ENY IDF attacks on own positions forced …